Singularity is a tool that creates docker-like process containers but without giving extra privileges to unprivileged users. It is used by grid pilot jobs (which are submitted by per-VO grid workload management systems) to isolate user jobs from the pilot's files and processes and from other users' files and processes. It also supplies a chroot environment in order to run user jobs in different operating system images under one Linux kernel.
For operating system kernels older than the one released for Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 7.6, singularity needs to use kernel capabilities that are only accessible to the root user, so it has to be installed with setuid-root executables. Securing setuid-root programs is difficult, but singularity keeps that privileged code to a minimum to keep the vulnerability low.
Beginning with the kernel released with RHEL 7.6, there is a fully supported but optional feature to allow unprivileged bind mounts in user namespaces, which allows singularity to run as an unprivileged user. The kernel version (3.10.0-957) is available as a security update for all RHEL (and its derivatives, Scientific Linux and CentOS) 7.x releases so it does not require upgrading to 7.6.
The OSG has installed singularity in OASIS, so many sites will eventually not need to install singularity locally if they enable it to run unprivileged.
Kernel vs. Userspace Security
Enabling unprivileged user namespaces increases the risk to the kernel. However, the kernel is more widely reviewed than Singularity and the additional capability given to users is more limited. OSG Security considers the non-setuid, kernel-based method to have a lower security risk.
The document is intended for system administrators who wish to either enable singularity to be run as an unprivileged user, install privileged singularity, or both.
As with all OSG software installations, there are some one-time (per host) steps to prepare in advance:
- Ensure the host has a supported operating system
- Obtain root access to the host
- Prepare the required Yum repositories
- A CVMFS installation for singularity image distribution
Choosing Unprivileged vs Privileged Singularity¶
There are two separate sets of instructions on this page:
As of December 2018, no VO in the OSG is ready to use unprivileged, non-setuid singularity from OASIS in production. VOs are, however, working to support it soon so OSG recommends that all RHEL 7.x installations enable support for unprivileged singularity, and for now also install the privileged RPM. RHEL 6.x installations have no option for unprivileged singularity and so will have to install the privileged RPM.
In addition, there a few singularity features that only work with the privileged RPM, so a limited number of sites will want to continue to take the risk of running the privileged RPM. These are the features only supported by privileged singularity:
Using loopback-based container image files. The default container images made by singularity are single, monolithic images containing a filesystem of files that need to be loopback-mounted by the kernel with root privileges. We recommend disabling this feature in privileged singularity and to use unpacked directory-based images instead. However, some sites may need this feature: in particular, High Performance Computing (HPC) systems often work better with large image files than with a collection of small files.
The overlay feature. The overlay feature of singularity uses overlayfs to be able to add bind mounts where mount points don't exist in the underlying image, and overlayfs is a privileged kernel feature. However, singularity also has another feature called underlay that provides essentially the same functionality without privileges. Additionally, the overlay feature doesn't work when the image is a directory distributed in CVMFS. We recommend enabling underlay and disabling overlay in privileged singularity installations.
Allocating new pseudo-tty devices. In the current RHEL 7.6 kernel, allocating pseudo-tty devices is a privileged operation. Therefore, interactive workflows such as those using
condor_submit -irequire privileged singularity. There is a workaround in the next (3.x) version of singularity in an option called
--fakerootthat makes the user name space appear to be running as the root user even though all its file accesses are as the original unprivileged user. The kernel then allows allocating pseudo-tty devices in the fakeroot environment.
The instructions in this section are for enabling singularity with non-setuid executables, which is available in OASIS, the OSG Software CVMFS distribution.
Enabling Singularity via OASIS¶
If the operating system is an EL 7 variant and has been updated to the EL 7.6 kernel or later, enable unprivileged singularity with the following steps:
Enable user namespaces via
(Optional) Disable network namespaces:
[email protected] # echo "user.max_net_namespaces = 0" \ > /etc/sysctl.d/90-max_net_namespaces.conf [email protected] # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/90-max_net_namespaces.conf
OSG VOs do not need network namespaces with singularity, and disabling them reduces the risk profile of enabling user namespaces.
Network namespaces are, however, utilized by other container systems, such as Docker. Disabling network namespaces may break other container solutions, or limit their capabilities (such as requiring the
--net=hostoption in Docker).
If you haven't yet installed cvmfs, do so.
Once you have the host configured properly, log in as an ordinary unprivileged user and verify that singularity in OASIS works:
[email protected] $ /cvmfs/oasis.opensciencegrid.org/mis/singularity/bin/singularity \ exec --contain --ipc --pid --bind /cvmfs \ /cvmfs/singularity.opensciencegrid.org/opensciencegrid/osgvo:el6 \ ps -ef WARNING: Container does not have an exec helper script, calling 'ps' directly UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME CMD user 1 0 2 21:27 ? 00:00:00 shim-init user 2 1 0 21:27 ? 00:00:00 ps -ef
The instructions in this section are for installing singularity with setuid-root executables.
Installing Singularity via RPM¶
To install singularity as
setuid, make sure that your host is up to date before installing the required packages:
Clean yum cache:
[email protected] # yum clean all --enablerepo=*
[email protected] # yum update
This command will update all packages
The singularity packages are split into two parts, choose the command that corresponds to your situation:
If you are installing singularity on a worker node, where images do not need to be created or manipulated, install just the smaller part to limit the amount of setuid-root code that is installed:
[email protected] # yum install singularity-runtime
If you want a full singularity installation, run the following command:
[email protected] # yum install singularity
In most cases, only
singularity-runtime is needed on the worker node;
installing only this smaller package reduces risk of potential security
The OSG distribution of singularity includes an option called
underlay that enables using bind mount points that do not exist in
the container image.
It is not enabled by default but recommended because it is less
vulnerable to security problems than the similar default
In addition, the
overlay option does not work on RHEL6 and does not
work correctly on RHEL7 when container images are distributed by CVMFS.
Set these options in
use overlay = no use underlay = yes
If you modify
/etc/singularity/singularity.conf, be careful with
your upgrade procedures.
RPM will not automatically merge your changes with new upstream
configuration keys, which may cause a broken install or inadvertently
change the site configuration. Singularity changes its default
configuration file more frequently than typical OSG software.
singularity.conf.rpmnew after upgrades and merge in any
changes to the defaults.
Limiting image types¶
Images based on loopback devices carry an inherently higher exposure to unknown kernel exploits compared to directory-based images distributed via CVMFS. See this article for further discussion.
The loopback-based images are the default image type produced by singularity
users and are common at sites with direct user logins. However (as of May
2018) we are only aware of directory-based images being used by OSG VOs. Hence,
it is a reasonable measure to disable the loopback-based images by setting
the following option in
max loop devices = 0
While reasonable for some sites, this is not required as there are currently no public kernel exploits for this issue; any exploits are patched by Red Hat when they are discovered.
After singularity is installed, as an ordinary user run the following command to verify it:
[email protected] $ singularity exec --contain --ipc --pid --bind /cvmfs \ /cvmfs/singularity.opensciencegrid.org/opensciencegrid/osgvo:el6 \ ps -ef WARNING: Container does not have an exec helper script, calling 'ps' directly UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME CMD user 1 0 1 21:41 ? 00:00:00 shim-init user 2 1 0 21:41 ? 00:00:00 ps -ef
Starting and Stopping Services¶
singularity has no services to start or stop.